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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Michael Russo was found guilty of one count of rape, one
count of first degree kidnapping, and one count of burglary. He received an aggregate
sentence of fixed life.
On appeal, Mr. Russo asserts two claims of error.

First, he contends that the

district court erred in failing to suppress a cell phone video discovered through a
warrantless, non-consensual search of his phone. Second, he contends that the district
court erred in allowing the State to present irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence
concerning his deviant sexual interests. Mr. Russo requests that his convictions and
sentences be vacated, and that his case be remanded for a new trial.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the pre-dawn hours of August 27, 2009, J.W. was raped at knifepoint by a
masked man in her Nampa apartment. (See 8/2/10 Tr., p.200, L.18 - p.220, L.15.)1
When her assailant left, J.W. quickly called 9-1-1 to report the crime. (8/2/10 Tr., p.191,
L.17 - p.193, L.2 (testimony of police dispatcher), p.220, L.16 - p.221, L.2, p.22, Ls.2-4
(testimony of J.W.); Ex. 1 (recording of 9-1-1 call).)
The investigating officers who responded to J.W.'s report immediately decided
that Michael Russo would be their suspect. 2 (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.289, Ls.18-22.) They

1 There are a large number of separately-bound transcripts in the record on appeal in
this case. Accordingly, transcripts are identified herein based on the date of the hearing
in question.
2 Mr. Russo was convicted of rape in Washington in 1995. (R., p.129.) Based largely
on this fact, he would contend, once he moved to Idaho, he became the "usual suspect"
for any rape or seemingly related crime in the Meridian/Nampa area. (See R., pp.12531 (police affidavit outlining the various crimes that Mr. Russo was accused of
committing prior to this case coming about).) Notably, prior to this case coming about,

1

quickly set up surveillance at his Meridian apartment (8/3/10 Tr., p.289, L.24 - p.290,
L.9, p.294, L.6 - p.296, L.21, p.350, L.7 - p.352, L.23) and, before too long, went about
securing a search warrant for his residence (see 8/3/10 Tr., p.380, L.19 - p.381, L.18.)
That warrant, authorizing searches of Mr. Russo's apartment and motorcycle, was
eventually issued by an Ada County magistrate. (See R., pp.133-34; 8/3/10 Tr., p.381,
Ls.15-17.)
While officers had Mr. Russo's apartment under surveillance (and before the
search warrant had arrived), they observed Mr. Russo leave his residence three timesonce to go behind his apartment building, and twice to check his mailbox. (R., p.142.)
The third time Mr. Russo left his apartment, which was some time shortly before noon,
at least two detectives seized, and then searched, him as part of what they referred to
as "an investigatory detention.,,3 (R., pp.139, 142; 1/27/10 Tr., p.68, Ls.19-23, p.70,
Ls.13-14, 17-18.)

Although they had not observed Mr. Russo do anything illegal,

possess a weapon, or act in a threatening manner, the detectives immediately
handcuffed him; searched him, supposedly for weapons; removed his wallet from one of
his back pockets and his cell phone from one of his front pockets4 ; and then placed
Mr. Russo in a patrol car.

(R., pp.139, 142; 1/27/10 Tr., p.68, L.24 - p.70, L.19.)

Approximately five minutes later, when another detective (Detective King) arrived,

Mr. Russo had not been charged with any of the Idaho crimes for which he had been
accused.
3 When Mr. Russo asked if he was being arrested, one of the officers told him he was
not; Detective Cain "told him it was called an investigatory detention." (R., p.142.)
4 Although the evidence before the district court at the time that Mr. Russo's
suppression motion was evaluated did not indicate whether Det. Cain knew that
Mr. Russo's wallet and cell phone were not weapons when he removed them from
Mr. Russo's pockets (see R., p.142), Det. Cain later testified at trial that he did know
what they were before he removed them from Mr. Russo's pockets. (See 8/3/10
Tr., p.356, Ls.1-4.)
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Mr. Russo's cell phone was handed over to that detective. (R., p.142; 1/27/10 Tr., p.70,
Ls.21-25.) Thereafter, Det. King opened the phone and viewed its contents, supposedly
"to determine ownership" of the phone,s whereupon he discovered a video believed to
have been taken of the rape of J.W. 6 (R., p.154; 1/27/10 Tr., p.70, L.23 - p.71, L.2.) At
some point after that, based (at least in part) on the video found on his cell phone,
Mr. Russo was arrested. (See 1/27/10 Tr., p.75, Ls.11-25, p.81, L.24 - p.82, L.6.) Also
based (at least in part) on the video found on the cell phone, the police obtained an
amended warrant authorizing a search of that phone.

(See R., pp.153-54 (relevant

portion of affidavit in support of amended warrant), 155-57 (amended warrant).)
On September 3, 2009, a grand jury indicted Mr. Russo on one count of rape,
one count offirst degree kidnapping, and one count of burglary. (R., pp.1 0-12.)
On January 7, 2010, while he was awaiting trial, Mr. Russo filed, pursuant to the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as we" as Article
I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, a motion to suppress, inter alia, the evidence
discovered on his cell phone.?

(R., pp.73-75.)

Mr. Russo argued that neither his

detention and search, nor the search of his phone, was undertaken pursuant to a

At the time that it evaluated Mr. Russo's suppression motion, the evidence before the
district court-a sworn affidavit in support of an amended search warrant-indicated
that Det. King searched the phone's contents "to determine ownership." (R., p.154.) At
trial, however, Det. King testified that he searched Mr. Russo's phone "to see if there
was [sic] and photos or videos on there." (8/3/10 Tr., p.492, Ls.15-19.)
6 The 8-second video clip depicts a close-up view of a male and a female engaged in
vaginal intercourse. Because of the close-up view, no faces are visible and the
identities of the participants, therefore, are not readily apparent. (See Ex. 49.)
? Mr. Russo sought suppression of certain evidence on two other grounds (see
R., pp.73-80 (suppression motion challenging not only the search of the phone, but also
the issuance of the search warrants and procurement of certain statements made after
invocation of the right to silence/counsel); however, because those suppression
arguments are not related to any issue raised on appeal, they are not discussed any
further herein.
5
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warrant, and that they exceeded anything that might be permissible pursuant to the
Terri exception to the warrant requirement. (See R., pp.73-75.)
In response, the State filed a memorandum in opposition (see R., pp.100-05,
111-22), and provided a documentary record by which the district court could discern
the relevant facts (see R., pp.123-59 (exhibits 1 through 6, consisting of the affidavit in
support of the original search warrant, the original search warrant itself, a police report
prepared by Det. Palfreyman (one of the detectives who detained and searched
Mr. Russo), a police report prepared by Det. Cain (the other detective who detained and
searched Mr. Russo), the affidavit in support of the amended search warrant, and the
amended search warrant)9). The State argued that Mr. Russo was properly detained
because police can always detain the occupants of a residence while a search warrant
is being sought for that residence; however, the State made no attempt to argue that the
search of Mr. Russo's person and, subsequently, his phone, could have been proper.
(See R., pp.111-14.)

The State then argued that, even if the phone was searched

illegally, the fruits of the search were not subject to exclusion because of either the
attenuation doctrine, the inevitable discovery doctrine, or the independent source
doctrine. (See R., pp.114-21.)

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court, held that
"where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing
of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him."
Id. at 30-31.
9 Later, at the suppression hearing, the district court also agreed to take judicial notice
of the transcript of the grand jury proceedings in finding the relevant facts. (See 1/27/10
Tr., p.20, Ls.6-25.)
8
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A lengthy hearing, consisting solely of arguments of counsel, was held on
Mr. Russo's suppression motion on January 27,2010. (See generally 1/27/10 Tr.) At
that hearing, defense counsel argued, inter alia, that Mr. Russo's phone could not be
searched pursuant to the warrant authorizing a search of his home and motorcycle
because the phone was located on Mr. Russo's person, and his person was outside
when he was detained by the police. (See 1/27/10 Tr., p.34, Ls.18-25, p.51, Ls.16-20.)
In response, the State appears to have augmented the argument presented in its
briefing, this time asserting that the search of Mr. Russo's cell phone was permissible
because the original search warrant authorized a search for phones (implicitly
authorizing a search of those phones, the State argued) and, even if the original search
warrant did not authorize the search, the amended warrant specifically authorized a
search of that phone. (See 1/27/10 Tr., p.43, Ls.7-23.) The State also argued, as it had
in its briefing, that regardless of the legality of the search of the phone, "inevitably, that
cell phone would have been searched as Mr. Russo was being interviewed by Detective
Weekes" (1/27/10 Tr., p.44, Ls.2-6); however, the State never explained how it was that
an "investigatory detention" would have inevitably resulted in a search of Mr. Russo's
phone (see generally 1/27/10 Tr., p.41, L.21 - p.47, L.13).10
The district court ruled on Mr. Russo's suppression motion from the bench at the
January 27,2010 hearing. 11

(See 1/27/10 Tr., p.80, L.11 - p.83, L.23.) The district

10 In its briefing, the State had argued that, even if the original search of the phone was
unconstitutional, because the police were specifically looking for a cell phone that might
contain photos or video of J.W.'s rape, having found a phone on Mr. Russo's person the
police inevitably would have sought a warrant authorizing a search of that phone.
~R., p.119.)
1 A few days later, the district court did enter a written order denying Mr. Russo's
motion; however, that order did not expand upon or clarify the district court's oral ruling,
as it simply incorporated the "factual findings and conclusions of the law" made on the
record at the hearing. (See R., p.166.)
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court concluded that Mr. Russo was properly detained, but it did not reach the issue of
whether either he (or his phone) was properly searched because the exclusionary rule
would not apply anyway since the video on the phone would have inevitably been
discovered. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.83, L.23.) The district court reasoned that it
was inevitable that the video would have been discovered because, even though the
first search warrant had not arrived yet, it had been issued and it authorized a search for
phones and implicitly authorized a forensic search of those phones. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81,
L.22 - p.83, L.23.)
Also prior to trial, the State sought leave to offer extensive evidence of
Mr. Russo's alleged "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence
404(b). (See, e.g., R., pp.44-46 (original notice of intent to offer evidence under I.R.E.
404(b)), pp.47-51 (original motion in limine), 52-72 (memorandum in support of original
motion in limine), pp.85-88 (reply memorandum in support of original motion in limine),
pp.187-227 (offer of proof in support of original motion in limine), p.237 (second motion
in limine), pp.228-35 (memorandum in support of second motion in limine).) Among the

evidence the State sought to have admitted under Rule 404(b) was evidence that:
(1) during a police interrogation, Mr. Russo had admitted to Detective Weekes that he
had sexual fantasies involving rape; and (2) certain pornographic images depicting
simulated rape were found in Mr. Russo's vehicle. After extensive proceedings on the
State's proffered Rule 404(b) evidence, the district court ultimately found the rape
fantasy evidence, and some of the rape pornography evidence, to be admissible. (See
3/18/10 Tr., p.67, L.14 - p.69, L.9, p.77, L.25 - p.78, L.7 (fantasy evidence), p.67, L.14

- p.68, L.10, p.78, LS.7-10 (pornography evidence); 4/22/10 Tr., p.9, LS.6-11 (fantasy
evidence); 5/11/10 Tr., p.23, L.18 - p.28, L.2, p.29, L.23 - p.31, L.23 (pornography
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evidence); R., pp.175-76 (both fantasy and pornography evidence), p.243 (pornography
evidence).
Mr. Russo's case went to trial in August of 2010.

(See generally 8/2/10

Tr.; 8/3/10 Tr.; 8/4/10 Tr.; 8/5/10 Tr.) It appears that, at trial, the cell phone video was
admitted in two different forms.12 First, Exhibit 47, a video made by the Idaho State
Police as officers went through the contents of the cell phone including, presumably, the
video in question, was admitted.

(See 8/3/10 Tr., p.494, L.2 - p.497, L.15; Ex. 47.)

Next, Exhibit 49, an "enhanced" version of the video, complete with still captures of
certain frames, was admitted. (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.502, L.3 - p.511, L.11; Ex. 49.) In
addition, there was substantial argument and testimony regarding the video. (See, e.g.,
8/2/10 Tr., p.185, LS.14-20 (prosecutor's opening statement referencing the video and
asserting that it "shows the defendant raping [J.W.]"); 8/2/10 Tr., p.226, Ls.1-19 (J.W.'s
testimony that Det. King showed her a video, and that she identified herself in that video
because "I know my vagina, and I know just how I am. I just knew it was me"); 8/3/10
Tr., p.492, LS.20-25 (Det. King describing the contents of the video); 8/3/10 Tr., p.511,
L.21 - p.512, L.5 (Det. King identifying certain characteristics of the female in the
video); 8/4/10 Tr., p.91, L.17 - p.94, L.10 (Dr. Lisa Minge discussing the physiology of

12 All of the exhibits in this case which contain sexual content, i.e., Exhibits 4-6 (photos
of the victim's pubic area), Exhibit 47 (video of officers going through Mr. Russo's cell
phone), Exhibit 49 ("enhanced" video from Mr. Russo's cell phone), Exhibit 51
(pornography allegedly found in Mr. Russo's car), were retained by the district court.
Accordingly, those exhibits have not yet been viewed by undersigned counsel.
Contemporaneously herewith though, Mr. Russo is filing a motion to transport these
exhibits to the Supreme Court (and held under seal), so that they may be viewed by
undersigned counsel and considered in conjunction with this appeal. Obviously, if
undersigned counsel's review of these exhibits reveals any error in this brief, counsel
will take all appropriate steps to remedy that error. Likewise, if counsel's review of
these exhibits changes the analysis as to which issues can or should be presented on
appeal, or alters the analysis of any of the issues presented on appeal, counsel will
seek leave to file a revised or supplemental brief.

7

the female in the video, comparing it to that of J.W., and offering her expert opinion that
J.W. is the female in the video); 8/4/10 Tr., p.155, Ls.15-24, p.159, LS.9-20
(prosecutor's closing argument reminding the jurors of the video and arguing that
Mr. Russo and J.W. are the two individuals depicted therein).)
Also admitted at Mr. Russo's trial was evidence and argument concerning
Mr. Russo's rape fantasies and his alleged possession of pornography depicting
simulated rapes.

With regard to the fantasies, the State offered the testimony of

Det. Weekes, who detailed Mr. Russo's statements on this topic:
Q. . . .. Did you and Mr. Russo have a conversation with regards
to pornography?

A. Yes, we did.
Q. And can you briefly describe what you were talking about-or I'll
back up.
What type of pornography did he describe?

A. He described watching pornography that depicted rape.
Q. And did he tell you what happens when he watches this type of
pornography?

A. He did. He told me that it turns him on and it makes him want to
have sex.
Q. Did he, in your conversation, provide to you when he first started
viewing this type of pornography?
A. He did. Mr. Russo explained to me that he believed he was
approximately 15 or 16 years old the first time he saw a video that
depicted rape. And he described that portion of that video to me.
Q. And what was his description?

A. He told me that the video was a female that a male had taken
out into the desert, and he had began raping this female. And in the
video, during the rape, the female decided that she liked it and became
happy and wanted to become a participant in it. And that's how he
described that video taking place.

8

Q. And did he go further and to say what type of fantasies were

developed from watching this video?
A. He talked-he talked to me about his fantasies that he had, yes.
Q. And what were those fantasies, detective?

A. He told me he had abnormal violent sexual fantasies.
Q. And can you briefly go into the conversation that you had with
Mr. Russo and what he told you?

A. I was talking to him about his fantasies and explained to him-I
told him that he didn't have fantasies like everybody else did. And he told
me he had abnormal sexual fantasies. And I told him he had violent
sexual fantasies. And initially, he told me he didn't. And I said, "Mike,
rape is violent." And he said, "you're right. Rape is violent. I shouldn't
deny that. I have violent abnormal sexual fantasies." But he minimized it
by saying that but [sic] his fantasies-his words are he minimized that
because at least in his fantasies, he wasn't hitting or punching someone.
Q. And did he go further into any specifics of what type of fantasy,
exactly, that he had?

A. He did. He told me that he had a fantasy about raping a woman,
and in the middle of it, she would decide she wanted it, and would
basically become a willing participant in that.

(8/4/10 Tr., p.39, L.24 - p.42, L.9.)
With regard to the pornography, the State offered Exhibits 50 (a photo of
Mr. Russo's Mazda 626) and 51 (printed pornographic images depicting simulated rape)
through Detective King, who testified that the pornography was found in Mr. Russo's
Mazda 626, along with registration and insurance paperwork for that vehicle showing
Mr. Russo as the owner of that vehicle. 13 (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.513, L.13 - p.517, L.11,
p.549, L.10-18.) Further, although the jurors could certainly have evaluated Exhibit 51

Detective King also testified about
Cherokee (see 8/3/10 Tr., p.517, L.22
testimony was later stricken based on
that vehicle (see 8/4/10 Tr., p.96, L.22
Ls.9-25).
13

rape pornography allegedly found in a Jeep
- p.523, L.11, p.549, Ls.19-24); however, that
the tenuousness of Mr. Russo's connection to
- p.104, L.25, p.105, L.20 - p.106, L.6, p.109,

9

for themselves, Det. King nevertheless described the pornographic images depicted
therein:
A male holding a female down by the shoulders as she's nude. Another
male penetrating her vagina with his penis. There's also another photo of
the same female, her mouth being penetrated by the male. . .. Bride
abuse is at the corner here, brideabuse.com. Well, I've seen this type of
picture before, and I know what Bride Abuse is, so you can't see dot-com,
but I believe it's brideabuse.com.
(8/3/10 Tr., p.516, Ls.16-25.)
Finally, in its closing argument, the State referenced both the rape fantasies and
the rape porn as follows: "[R]eturn to what Detective Weekes and her conversations
with Mr. Russo about his sexual fantasies, how this makes him feel powerful, how it
makes him feel in control, these rapes. He watches the pornography. It has the rape in
it." (8/4/10 Tr., p.159, Ls.3-8.)
Ultimately, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. (8/5/10 Tr., p.5, L.18 p.6, L.8; R., pp.369-70.) Thereafter, the district court imposed an aggregate sentence
of fixed life. (See 11/30/10 Tr., p.96, Ls.4-16; R., pp.413-14.) The district court then
entered its judgment of conviction on December 1,2010. (R., pp.413-14.)
On December 28,2010, Mr. Russo filed a notice of appeal. (R., pp.415-16.) On
appeal, he contends that the district court erred in failing to suppress the cell phone
video, and in allowing the State to offer evidence and argument concerning his deviant
sexual interests.

10

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err in failing to suppress the video discovered by police in an
unconstitutional search of Mr. Russo's cell phone?

2.

Did the district court err in admitting irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence
concerning Mr. Russo's deviant sexual interests?

11

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Video Discovered In An
Unconstitutional Search Of Mr. Russo's Cell Phone
A.

Introduction
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the following

guarantee:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.14

This text embodies a Constitutional preference that

governmental searches and seizures be undertaken pursuant to warrants. Thus, it has
been held that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

"The burden of proof rests with the State to

demonstrate that [a given warrantless] search either fell within a well-recognized
exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the
circumstances." State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995). Traditionally, it has been
held that if the State fails to meet its burden in this regard, and the search in question is
determined to be unconstitutional, the exclusionary rule precludes the State from using
its ill-gotten evidence against the defendant at trial. State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908,

14 The Idaho Constitution provides a guarantee that is virtually identical to that of the
Fourth Amendment. See IDAHO CONST. Article I § 17.
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915 (Ct. App. 2006); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (referring to the
exclusionary rule

as "an

essential part of both the Fourth

and

Fourteenth

Amendments").
In this case, the district court did not reach the issue of whether Mr. Russo or his
phone were improperly searched; instead, it ruled that even if the searches were
undertaken in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule would not apply
since the video found on the phone would have inevitably been discovered by the police
anyway. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.83, L.23.) The district court reasoned that it was
inevitable that the video would have been discovered because, even though the first
search warrant had not arrived yet, it had been issued and it authorized a search for
phones and implicitly authorized a forensic search of those phones. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81,
L.22 - p.83, L.23.)
Mr. Russo submits that the district court's ruling was in error. Below, he explains
why the searches of his person and his phone violated the Fourth Amendment.
Thereafter, he explains why the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule
does not apply and why the proper remedy for the Fourth Amendment violations,
therefore, was exclusion of the ill-gotten evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. The appellate court

must accept those of the trial court's findings of fact which were supported by
substantial evidence, but it can freely review the application of constitutional principles
to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561 (Ct. App. 1996).
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C.

The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Cell Phone Video
As noted, Mr. Russo contends that the officers' search of his person, then his cell

phone, was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. This is so for two reasons:
first, although a magistrate issued a warrant authorizing the search of his residence and
motorcycle, that warrant did not extend to a search of his person where he was
detained outside of his residence; second, the Terry exception to the warrant
requirement cannot justify a search of Mr. Russo's person under the facts of this case
and, even if it could, the search of Mr. Russo's phone was not a valid Terry search.
Mr. Russo further contends that, because discovery of the cell phone video was
not inevitable under the facts of this case, the exclusionary rule applies such that the
district court erred in failing to suppress the fruits of the officers' unconstitutional search
of his phone.

1.

Under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), Even If Mr. Russo Was
Properly Detained While Officers Obtained And Executed A Search
Warrant For His Residence, He Could Not Be Searched Pursuant To That
Warrant

Michigan v. Summers involved facts analogous, in many respects, to those in this
case. In Summers, police were preparing to execute a search warrant on a residence
when they encountered the owner of the house heading down his front steps; the
officers detained him and, eventually, searched him (finding contraband on his person).
Summers, 452 U.S. at 693.

The question in that case was whether the Fourth

Amendment permits officers to temporarily detain the occupant of a residence while
they search the house pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate. Id. at 694. The
Supreme Court held that it does. Id. at 705.
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In light of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Summers, therefore,
there is little doubt that the police in this case were acting within the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment when they detained Mr. Russo outside his home as they obtained
and executed a search warrant for his home. See id.; see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531
U.S. 326, 331-34 (2001) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation in the detention of the
occupant outside of his home (in what was less than a full arrest) while a search warrant
was being obtained).
However, just because Mr. Russo could be detained to: (1) "prevent[ ] flight in
the event that incriminating evidence is found"; (2) "minimize[e] the risk of harm to the
officers"; and (3) facilitate "the orderly completion of the search," i.e., provide access to
the police so that they did not destroy his residence, id. at 702-03, that does not mean
that he could also be searched.

In fact, the Summers Court spoke to this very issue

and held that because the occupant was found outside the place or thing to be
searched pursuant to the warrant, i.e., the residence, the warrant itself did not allow for
a search of his person while he was being detained. Id. at 694. The Court stated as
follows:
The State attempts to justify the eventual search of respondent's person
by arguing that the authority to search premises granted by the warrant
implicitly included the authority to search persons on those premises, just
as that authority included an authorization to search furniture and
containers in which the particular things described might be concealed.
But ... even if otherwise acceptable, this argument could not justify the
initial detention of respondent outside the premises described in the
warrant.
Id. (emphasis added).

Because a search warrant does not extend beyond the place or thing to be
searched, see id., and because the original search warrant in this case authorized only
the searches of Mr. Russo's residence and motorcycle (R., p.134), the search of
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Mr. Russo's person (and, by extension, the phone found on his person), while he was
outside his residence, was clearly not conducted in accordance with the warrant. Thus,
that search is presumptively unconstitutional and it is the State's burden to demonstrate
that a well recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies.

2.

Even If Mr. Russo Was Validly Detained, Under The Standards Set Forth
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), There Was No Basis To Search Him
For Weapons And, Even If There Was, The Officers' Search Of
Mr. Russo's Phone Far Exceeded What Was Permissible Under Terry

When police officers detain occupants of residences being searched pursuant to
magistrate-issued warrants, they need not due so at undue undue personal risk. Thus,
in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005), the Supreme Court held that it was
constitutionally permissible for officers to handcuff the detain occupants of the residence
being searched because, under the facts of that case, the execution of the warrant was
"inherently dangerous.,,15 Id. at 99-100.
Likewise, many courts have held that it is constitutionally permissible for officers
to frisk the detained occupants of the residence being searched where the officers have
a reasonable articulable suspicion that the detainees are armed and dangerous. For
example, in Germany v. United States, 984 A.2d 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2009), the D.C. Circuit
held that, under "the totality of the circumstances" (which included the facts that officers
were searching for both guns and drugs, it was dark, the officers were badly
outnumbered by the "partying" occupants, and the defendant was wearing a coat under
which a weapon could be concealed), the officers had a "reasonable, articulable
suspicion that appellant might be armed and dangerous," such that they "acted lawfully

15 In Mena, officers were searching for weapons in the residence of a wanted gang
member, and the officers were outnumbered at a 2: 1 ratio. Mena, 544 U.S. at 100.
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in performing a pat-down frisk of appellant for weapons." Id. at 1228-30. The Germany
Court was very clear, however, in explaining that the "pat-down frisk" approved of was
no more intrusive than the limited search authorized in Terry, see id. at 1222 n. 7, and
that, by approving of the pat-down frisk in that case, it most certainly was "not hold[ing]
that, in every case, police may frisk all occupants of a residence being searched
pursuant to a warrant" because, "[a]s Professor LaFave aptly puts it, 'it remains clear
that there is no authority justifying the police to "routinely" frisk those present at any
search warrant execution.'" Id. at 1230 n.19 (quoting 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.9(d) (4 th ed. Supp. 2009-10)).
Apparently, most jurisdictions are in accord with the D.C. Circuit on this issue.
See Germany, 984 A.2d at 1230 n.19 (compiling cases wherein other courts had
approved of Terry frisks of detainees at search warrant executions, based on the theory
that there was reasonable basis to believe that those detainees were armed and
dangerous). Certainly Idaho is one such jurisdiction. In State v. Kester, 137 Idaho 643
(Ct. App. 2002), the Court of Appeals applied the Terry standard to a situation in which,
while police were executing a warrant at a residence, an individual approached that
residence and was detained pursuant to Summers, supra. Id. at 459-61. The Court of
Appeals held that the subsequent frisk of that individual was constitutionally permissible
because, under the facts of that case (it was late at night; the individual supplied a
dubious explanation for why he was present; officers were investigating a suspected
guns-for-drugs operation; and the individual was wearing a "fanny pack" which could
have concealed a weapon), it was reasonable to believe that the individual was armed
and dangerous, and engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 461.
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In light of this standard, the first question in this case is whether, when Detective
Pelfreyman and Cain detained Mr. Russo, there was evidence to support a reasonable
articulable suspicion that he was armed and presently dangerous. Mr. Russo submits
that there was no such evidence. It was nearly noon, so lighting would not have been a
concern; Mr. Russo was alone and, therefore, outnumbered by the officers; Mr. Russo
was wearing jeans and a shirt (R., p.142) and, therefore, would have had little
opportunity to conceal a weapon; and Mr. Russo was already in handcuffs by the time
he was searched (see R., p.142), so even if he had a weapon, it would have been
difficult, if not impossible, to access and use effectively. Moreover, the district court
specifically found that U[t]he officers had not observed the defendant to do anything
illegal. The officers did not see the defendant with any weapon. And the officers did not
see the defendant act in a threatening manner." (1/27/10 Tr., p.68, L.24 - p.69, L.2.)
The only fact which could have raised any security concern for the officers at all was
that J.W.'s rapist used a knife to gain her compliance; however, the officers would have
had no reason to suspect that (even assuming they had the right suspect in their midst)
Mr. Russo still had the knife on him, hours after the rape, as he checked his mail. In
short, there was no reasonable basis to believe that Mr. Russo was armed and
dangerous when he was detained by the police and, therefore, the search of his person
was impermissible under Terry and Kester.
Even if the pat-down frisk of Mr. Russo's person was somehow permissible
though, the fact is that once his cell phone was identified as such-and certainly once it
was removed from Mr. Russo's reach-it was not subject to further search.

First, a

phone is not a weapon, so once the item in Mr. Russo's pocket was identified as a
phone, the officers had no right to invade Mr. Russo's privacy further by seizing it or
18

searching its contents. State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730 (Ct. App. 2005) (HAfter
satisfying themselves that the item was a container and not a weapon, however, the
officers had no valid reason to further invade Faith's right to be free of police intrusion
absent reasonable cause to arrest him. . . . We conclude that the officers' removal of
the Altoids tin from Faith's person was beyond the permissible limits of Terry and was a
violation of Faith's Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search.").
Second, even if the cell phone itself is considered to be a weapon, the data
stored on a cell phone is not, under any circumstances, a weapon. Accordingly, an
officer would never be within his rights to peruse the contents of a cell phone as part of
a protective frisk. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 ("The sole justification of the search in the
present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must
therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns,
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.").
Third, to the extent that a cell phone or its contents could somehow be construed
as posing a threat to the detaining officers, as soon as that phone was taken out of
Mr. Russo's reach, it ceased to be a threat and, therefore, could not be searched
further. See Faith, 141 Idaho at 730-31 (holding that even if officers were concerned
that an Altoids tin might contain a weapon, once that tin was removed from the
handcuffed suspect's reach, it could no longer be construed as posing a threat and,
therefore, H[t]he opening of the box and inspection of its contents was unlawful"). In
other words, as soon as the risk attendant to the item in question abates, so too does
the justification for the search of that item. See id.; cf. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,
343 (2011) (making it clear that in a search incident to arrest, officers may search the
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arrestee's vehicle for officer safety reasons only to the extent that the vehicle, and any
weapons that may be contained therein, are reasonably within the arrestee's reach).
In light of the foregoing, it is incontrovertible that the removal of the cell phone
from Mr. Russo's pants pocket, and the subsequent search of the data stored on that
cell phone, cannot be justified under the Terry frisk exception to the warrant
requirement. Accordingly, the State failed to establish that a well-recognized exception
to the warrant requirement applies in this case and it is apparent that Mr. Russo's rights
were violated.

3.

Because The "Inevitable Discovery" Doctrine Has No Application In This
Case, The Exclusionary Rule Applies And The District Court Erred In
Failing To Suppress The Cell Phone Video

"The exclusionary rule is the judicial remedy for addressing illegal searches and
bars the admission or use of evidence gathered pursuant to an illegal search." State v.

Bunting, 142 Idaho 908,915 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,496
(2001 ». While there are some exceptions to the general rule requiring the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence, the State bears the burden of pleading of proving these
exceptions by a preponderance of the evidence. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
444-45 & n.5 (1984).
One exception to the exclusionary rule is the so-called "inevitable discovery"
doctrine. See id. at 441-48. In order for the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply, the
State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the information at issue
would have independently been discovered through lawful means. Bunting, 142 Idaho
at 915.
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In applying the inevitable discovery doctrine and determining whether the
evidence at issue would have inevitably been discovered through lawful means
independent of the illegal search, the reviewing court is not permitted to assume the
hypothetical of what would have been discovered had the officer acted lawfully. Rather,
there must be a showing that some other independent action was already taking place,
or had taken place, that would have revealed the same evidence. Id. at 916-917. The
Bunting Court made this abundantly clear:

The underlying rationale of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that a
preponderance of the evidence proves that some action that actually took
place, or was in the process of taking place, would have led to the
discovery of the evidence that was already obtained through unlawful
police action. The inevitable discovery doctrine was not intended to allow
a court to consider what actions the authorities should or could have taken
and in doing so then determine that lawful discovery of the already
unlawfully obtained evidence would have been inevitable.
Bunting, 142 Idaho at 916-917 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

In fact,

more than 25 years ago, the Court of Appeals put it more bluntly: "The [inevitable
discovery] doctrine 'is not intended to swallow the exclusionary rule whole by
substituting what the police should have done for what they really did.'"

State v.

Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 392 (Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Judge Burnett's concurring
opinion in State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 226 (Ct. App. 1984».

Thus, recently, in

State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, _,267 P.3d 1278, 1285 (Ct. App. 2011), the Court of
Appeals declined to apply the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule
just because an investigation may have reached the same result absent the Fourth
Amendment violation. The Liechty Court observed as follows:
[T]he issue before us whether an additional line of investigation would
have revealed the [contraband], not whether the evidence would have
been discovered had the encounter between the officer and Liechty not
occurred while the officer was standing in the open passenger doorway
[the Fourth Amendment violation]. Indeed, we decline to predict how such
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a conversation would have unfolded. The record does not disclose any
additional line of investigation and, as a result, the inevitable discovery
doctrine does not apply.
Liechty, 267 P.3d at 1285.

In this case, the inevitable discovery doctrine has no application. The State's
argument below was that, even had the detectives not (impermissibly) searched
Mr. Russo's phone when they did, once they realized that he had a phone on his
person, they would have obtained a new search warrant (such as the amended warrant
that was actually issued in this case) authorizing a search of that phone. 16 (See 1/27/10
Tr., p.44, Ls.2-6; R., p.119.) This, however, would not have been an independent line of
investigation; it would have simply been a continuation of the already-existing line of
investigation, which does not satisfy the standards of the inevitable discovery doctrine.
See Liechty, 267 P.3d at 1285; Bunting, 142 Idaho at 916-917; Holman, 109 Idaho at

392.

Furthermore, simply asserting that, had the officers not searched the phone

illegally they would have obtained a warrant to search that phone is doing nothing more
substituting what the police should have done for what they really did. Again, this fails
to satisfy the standards of inevitable discovery doctrine. Holman, 109 Idaho at 392.

Insofar as the State attempts to argue that the contents of the phone would have
inevitably been discovered because of issuance of the actual amended search warrant
in this case, that argument would be absurd because the State used the fruits of its
illegal search of that phone to obtain the amended warrant. (R., p.154 (stating in the
affidavit in support of the request for an amended warrant that "a cellular phone was
recovered from Mr. Russo's person during a pat down search for officer safety. This
phone was opened and looked at to determine ownership. Your affiant knows that a
video was located on that phone that appears to depict the victim from this morning's
rape. . .. Your affiant requests permission to search the entirety of the phone).) Not
only does this satisfy the inevitable discovery doctrine's requirement of an independent
line of investigation, but it also violates the basic principle that a search that is unlawful
at its inception cannot be validated by what it turns up. Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471,484 (1963).
16
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Likewise, the district court's application of the inevitable discovery doctrine was in
error, albeit for a different reason. This district court concluded that it was inevitable
that the cell phone video would have been discovered because, even though the
original search warrant had not arrived yet, that warrant had been issued and it
authorized a search for phones, which implicitly authorized a forensic search of those
phones. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.83, L.23.) Thus, the district court appears to have
assumed that, had the original search warrant been present on-scene, it would have
authorized a search of Mr. Russo's person and the cell phone kept on his person. (See
1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.83, L.23.)

However, this reason is flawed since, for the

reasons set forth in Part I(C)(1), supra, a search warrant authorizing a search of a
residence does not extend to the person of someone detained outside the residence.
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Russo submits that the State has failed to prove that
an exception to the exclusionary rule applies and, therefore, the district court erred in
failing to suppress the evidence obtained in the illegal search of Mr. Russo's phone.

II.
The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Offer Irrelevant, Highly Prejudicial
Evidence And Argument Concerning Mr. Russo's Deviant Sexual Interests

A.

Introduction
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404, evidence of a defendant's bad character or

bad acts may not admitted to show that the he is a person who acted in conformance
with his bad character. Evidence of the defendant's bad acts may be admitted for other
purposes though, such as to prove motive, intent, or plan.
In this case, the district court allowed the State to present evidence that
Mr. Russo has had sexual fantasies involving rape, and that he possessed pornography
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depicting simulated rape, ostensibly to show that the Mr. Russo had the motive, intent,
and plan to rape J.W.

However, because the rape fantasy and rape pornography

evidence does not evidence any motive, intent, or plan on Mr. Russo's part to rape J.W.
and because, even if it did, its probative value was so substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect, the district court erred in allowing the State to present this evidence to
the jury.

B.

Applicable Legal Standards
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that, generally speaking, evidence of "other

crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show that the person acted in conformity therewith."

I.R.E. 404(b).

However, such

evidence may be admitted "for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident .... "
Id.

Under I.R.E. 404(b), there is a two-tiered

analysis for determining the

admissibility of "prior bad act" evidence. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). The
court must first "determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other
crime or wrong as fact" and "whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if established,
would be relevant ... to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged,
other than propensity." Id. If the evidence is insufficient to establish the other crime or
wrong as fact, or if the other crime or wrong, even if proven, is not relevant to an issue
other than character or propensity, it is inadmissible and the inquiry ends.

See id.

However, if the evidence is sufficient to prove the other crime or wrong, and that crime
or wrong is relevant to some valid issue, the court must then "engage in a balancing
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under I.RE. 403 and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs the probative value of the evidence." Id.
Turning to the question of the applicable standard of review, the Idaho Court of
Appeals has held that the district court's determination that the evidence in question is
relevant to some issue besides the defendant's bad character is reviewed de novo, but
the district court's balancing of the probative value of the evidence against the unfair
prejudice to the defendant is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Miller, 141
Idaho 148, 150 (Ct. App. 2004).

C.

The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Offer Irrelevant, Highly
Prejudicial Evidence And Argument Concerning Mr. Russo's Deviant Sexual
Interests
As noted, prior to Mr. Russo's trial, the State sought leave to offer extensive

evidence of Mr. Russo's other crimes, wrongs, or acts, including evidence that he has
had sexual fantasies about rape and has possessed pornography depicting simulated
rape. The State argued that the fantasy and pornography evidence was relevant to a
non-character/non-propensity

issue-Mr.

Russo's

motive,

intent,

or

plan-and,

therefore, was admissible under I.RE. 404(b). (R, pp.45, 59-60, 88, 187-227, 228-35,
237; 3/18/10 Tr., p.8, L.14 - p.19, L.11; 5/11/10 Tr., p.3, L.15 - p.4, L.19, p.5, L.20-

p.6, L.17, p.9, L.20 - p.11, L.3.) The district court agreed, and it ruled the rape fantasy
and rape pornography evidence admissible. (See R, pp.175-76, 243; 3/18/10 Tr., p.67,
L.14 - p.69, L.9, p.77, L.25 - p.78, L.10; 4/22/10 Tr., p.8, L.21 - p.9, L.13; 5/11/10
Tr., p.18, L.7 - p.25, L.22, p.29, L.23 - p.31, L.23.)
Mr. Russo contends that the district court's ruling was in error, as it was based on
a faulty application of the Grist standard. Specifically, Mr. Russo asserts that the rape
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fantasy and rape pornography evidence is not relevant to any proper purpose and, even
if it is marginally relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice.

1.

The Rape Fantasy And Rape Pornography Evidence In This Case Was
Relevant Only To Mr. Russo's Character

Taken together, evidence of Mr. Russo's sexual fantasies involving rape and his
possession of pornography depicting simulated rape tend to show only that Mr. Russo is
sexually aroused by the thought and/or depiction of rape. It is not probative of whether
he was the one who actually raped J.W. on August 27, 2009; nor is it probative of any
actual plan or intent to rape J.W.

Indeed, the only way that this evidence can be

characterized as showing Mr. Russo's intent or plan to rape is to assume that because
Mr. Russo has a predilection for rape, he must have planned or intended to act in
conformity with that predilection; however, this is precisely the type of baseless
generalization that Rule 404 is intended to guard against. That Rule makes it clear that,
just because someone has done a certain act, shown a certain propensity, or exhibited
a certain character trait in the past, one cannot assume that he acted accordingly on the
date in question.

See I.R.E. 404.

Indeed, in this case, the prosecution never

attempted-either in arguing its motions in limine, or in arguing its case to the jury at
trial-to connect Mr. Russo's predilection for rape to any particular plan or scheme to
rape J.W.17
The only (proper) issue that Mr. Russo's predilection for rape could possibly be
relevant to would be motive. The theory, perhaps, would be that, given Mr. Russo's
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predilections, he raped J.W. to satisfy his sexual desires; under this argument, sexual
gratification would be the motive. However, such an argument would make little sense
in a case such as this one. Quite obviously, anyone who breaks into a young woman's
apartment, clearly for the sole purpose of raping her, does so for the purpose of sating
his sexual urges. Thus, motive is simply not at issue in this case. Cf. State v. Roach,
109 Idaho 973, 974-75 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that even in the case of a specific intent
crime, such as lewd conduct with a minor, because "the intent needed to convict can be
manifested by the circumstances attending the act," the defendant's intent may not be
sufficiently at issue in the case to warrant introduction of "other crimes" evidence aimed
at proving intent). Moreover, even if the motive of sexual gratification were somehow
relevant to this case, this motive has in no way been shown to be specific to J.W.
Accordingly, even if Mr. Russo had a motive to rape generally, this motive in no way
connects him particularly to the rape of J.W.

2.

Even If The Rape Fantasy And Rape Pornography Evidence In This Case
Was Relevant To Such Proper Topics As Motive, Intent, Or Plan, It Was
Nonetheless Inadmissible Because Its Probative Value Was Substantially
Outweighed By The Risk Of Unfair Prejudice To Mr. Russo

Assuming arguendo that there is some relevance to the evidence demonstrating
Mr. Russo's predilection for rape, the probative value of any such evidence is
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice attendant to that evidence.
Accordingly, he contends that the district court erred in finding it admissible under Rule
404(b).

Certainly, the State did raise the inference that J.W.'s rape was a carefully planned
crime. And the evidence supports this inference. But the State never attempted to
explain how Mr. Russo's rape fetish connected to any particular plan.
17
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Initially, as noted in Part II(C)(1), supra, it is Mr. Russo's contention that evidence
of his rape fantasies and his possession of pornography depicting simulated rape is
wholly irrelevant to anything other than character or propensity; in particular, he
contends that it is not relevant to motive, intent, or plan. However, even if this Court
determines that such evidence is relevant to an issue such as motive, intent, or plan,
Mr. Russo contends that it is only marginally relevant (for same reasons, set forth
above, that he contends that it is not relevant at all).
More importantly, Mr. Russo contends that this evidence is extraordinarily
prejudicial.

As noted, it demonstrates a predilection for rape which, in the average

juror's mind, would likely be viewed as an extremely deviant and disturbing preference.
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that, traditionally, there has been
an "unstated belief that sexual deviancy is a character trait of especially powerful
probative value for predicting a defendant's behavior," State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,
569-70 (2007) (quoting D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook § 13.9 (1995)), so any
such evidence would tend to have a significant impact on the jury's verdict. Thus, in
recent years, the Idaho courts have repeatedly recognized that evidence of extreme
sexual deviancy is simply too prejudicial to the defendant to be put before the jury
where its probative value is marginal. See, e.g., State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459,466
(Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]here was a high risk that the jury would convict Pokorney based
upon propensity and sexual deviancy. We are constrained to conclude that the unfair
prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence."); State v.

Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669-70 (2010) (finding that the error in admitting prior
instances of the defendant's sexual misconduct with children was not harmless because
U[e]vidence of prior sexual misconduct with young children is so prejudicial that there is
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a reasonable possibility this error contributed to Johnson's conviction"). As this is just
such a case, it is apparent that the district court erred in concluding that the probative
value of the rape fantasy and rape pornography evidence was not substantially
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and, therefore, the district court erred in
admitting that evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Russo respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the district court orders denying suppression of the cell phone video and
admitting evidence of his sexual fantasies and pornography; that it vacate his
convictions and sentences; and that it remand his case for a new trial.
DATED this 20th day of March, 2012.
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